Charter Flips by National Banks

by Gary Whalen

Abstract

Bank management can change its charter and so its supervisor(s) at any time. Some argue that the supervisory competition resulting from the existence of the charter flip option promotes more efficient bank regulation. Others assert that it leads to "competition in laxity" as supervisors compete for clientele. Research on this issue is warranted because little empirical research on charter flips is available and the frequency of flips appears to have risen during the past decade.

Disclaimer

Any whole or partial reproduction of material in this paper should include the following citation: Gary Whalen, "Charter Flips by National Banks," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, E&PA Working Paper 2002-1, June 2002.

Availability

This Economics Working Paper is available for viewing in Adobe's PDF format. The PDF viewer is available for download free from Adobe in versions for different platforms.